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Abstract 
 
This article1 seeks to explain recent patterns of corruption in the City of Bell, 
California. After reviewing the literature on municipal corruption, Progressive 
reform, and political participation in immigrant communities, the article examines 
the Bell case study. It argues that the council-manager form of government 
contributes to civic disengagement in California’s high-immigration cities. 
Insulated from civic accountability, Bell became effectively a ‘predator state’ as 
local officials exploited governmental power and resources for personal gain. 
Implications for political reform and local state-building in high immigration 












                       Introduction 
 
In July 2010 reports of systemic political corruption began to emerge from the tiny Los Angeles 
suburb of Bell, California. Located in an industrial corridor south and east of downtown Los Angeles, 
the ‘Gateway Cities’ region had already developed a reputation for municipal corruption. In recent 
years, the cities of Maywood, Vernon, Bell Gardens, Compton, and South Gate have been plagued by 
rash of corruption scandals (Saltzstein 2004, Fulton 1997). The initial allegations in Bell focused on 
extraordinary salaries for city officials. City Manager Robert Rizzo was found to be earning $1.5 
million annually in combined pay and benefits, and was set to become California’s highest-paid future 
retiree at $600,000 per year. Assistant City Manager Angela Spaccia and Police Chief Randy Adams and 
four of Bell’s five city council members also were found to be earning salaries in the range of $500,000 
per year. Additional corrupt practices included illegal taxes and fees assessed to fund city employee 
pensions, illegal loans to city employees, and charges that Bell’s police department had targeted illegal 
immigrant drivers to generate exorbitant impound fees. 
In March 2011 voters recalled all of the indicted council members and elected a new city council. 
But for nearly nine months, Bell languished as an interim city administrator, interim assistant city 
administrator, and interim city attorney—each appointed by the besieged City Council—ran day-to-day 
operations. In March 2013 five of six former council-members were convicted of misappropriation of 
public funds. Sentences ranged from home confinement for George Cole, to two years in prison for 
Teresa Jocobo.  Rizzo, who had recently plead guilty to federal tax evasion charges, pleaded no contest 
to the corruption charges and was sentenced to 12 years in state prison and ordered to pay nearly $9 
million in restitution to the city. His assistant, Angela Spaccia, was sentenced to nearly 12 years in state 
prison and ordered to pay $8 million in restitution (Knoll and Mather 2014). 
Recent scandals in Bell and other Gateway Cities raise a number of important questions about the 
health of democracy in California’s high-immigration cities. The principal question for this paper is: 
How did such pervasive corruption emerge in a political system specifically designed to prevent 
corruption and produce good government? It is argued that reform structures intended to distance 
policymakers from corrupting influences instead insulated city officials from traditional forms of 
political accountability. In the context of the city’s rapid demographic and political transformation 
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during the late 1990s and 2000s, Bell effectively became a ‘predator state’ as officials exploited political 
power and community resources for personal gain. Implications for the practice and reform of municipal 
government in high immigration cities are explored. 
  
Municipal Corruption and Progressive Reform 
 
The topic of municipal corruption harkens back to an older political science literature examining 
corrupt Machine Era governments and Progressive attempts to reform them. As the account goes, late 
19th century southern and eastern Europeans used their organizational skills and growing numbers to 
create urban political “machines” in a number of important immigration portal cities. Using a variety of 
tactics, immigrants filled a power void in American municipal government to assemble and perpetuate 
political machines. According to Judd and Swanstrom (2002), “the major types of graft in American 
cities involved handing out lucrative franchises, setting highly profitable utility rates, authority over 
the city’s police power . . . , and the control of public works” (61). Neighborhoods that turned out to 
support the machine typically received the best services, jobs and contracts, while opponents were either 
ignored or punished. So-called ‘spoils systems’ operated in cities such as Boston, Chicago, Kansas City, and 
Philadelphia. Probably the most infamous was New York’s Tammany Hall – led by William M. “Boss” 
Tweed – that helped Irish immigrants consolidate political and economic power through the city’s powerful 
Democratic Party.  
By the early 20th century urban middle-class Protestants mounted a counter-offensive, labeling 
machine rule as inherently corrupt and a threat to American democratic traditions. Organized under the 
general banner of Progressivism, this reform movement mobilized to change the rules of the game of 
American politics.2 At the municipal level, the Progressive Movement sought to rein in machine 
corruption and institute businesslike efficiency to city government. Early 20th century Progressive 
reformers were animated by a belief in the new science of public administration, drawing heavily from 
recently devised principles of business administration popularized by management theorists such as 






Their main rhetorical pitch was to take politics out of the governance of cities and the saying, “There is 
no Democratic or Republican way to pave a street,” became their mantra.  Operating mostly at the level of 
their state governments where the influence of Progressives was greatest, reformers passed a number of state 
laws that undermined machine rule. For example, instead of strong elected mayors, cities in Progressive-
reformed states would be run by professional, non-partisan bureaucrats known as city managers whose only 
ostensible goal would be to deliver the highest quality municipal services impartially and at the lowest cost.  
Under the theory that elected officials should look out for the good of the entire city rather than 
particular neighborhoods, Progressives also advocated for replacing district-based elections with at-large 
council elections. In practice, at-large council elections undermined immigrant political representation 
by denying immigrant communities a geographic power base, a charge that still resonates in California 
municipal politics today.3 
In many parts of the country, Progressives also succeeded in establishing nonpartisan local 
elections, again, under the aegis that politics should be removed from the science of day-to-day service 
delivery.  A principle effect of this reform was to deprive immigrant voters of the partisan cue that many 
relied upon to vote for the machine’s preferred candidate. Other reforms, such as the initiative, 
referendum, and recall, were intended to place decision-making authority directly in the hands of voters. 
Coupled with new Progressive-inspired residency and voter registration requirements, the new rules 
disproportionally empowered urban middle-class WASPs.  Add to the list off-cycle elections, in which 
local elections were isolated from national and state elections, and civil service bureaucracies employing 
merit systems that favored educated WASPs, the Progressive movement fundamentally restructured the 
political game of American local government.  Collectively known as the council-manager form of 
government, the new institutional arrangements were largely intended to release the Machines power grip 
on major American cities (Judd and Swanstrom 2002). Like many states during the early 20th century, 
particularly in the West and South, California’s state and local political institutions were heavily 
influenced by Progressive reforms (Debow and Syer 2009). In place for more than 100 years, these rules 
of Progressive municipal governance are now so well-entrenched that most of us are unaware that they 







What are the impacts of Progressive reforms today? Scholars debating the Progressive legacy 
generally agree that, collectively, Progressive reforms tend to depress immigrant turnout in municipal 
elections and shift political power toward native-born WASPs (Hajnal and Lewis 2003, Bridges 1997, 
Erie 1988). Nonpartisan elections are thought to deprive immigrants and low-information voters of 
partisan cues and depress turnout. At-large elections are thought to disenfranchise poor minorities and 
immigrants by limiting opportunities for representation. Off-cycle elections are thought to negatively 
impact immigrants and minorities by placing additional burdens on voter time and information 
gathering. Finally, civil service systems and city manager-run governments are said to favor educated 
Whites who can pass rigorous professional exams (Caren 2007, Hajnal and Lewis 2002, Elazar 1972, 
Bridges and Kronick 1999). 
How then, in a system specifically designed to mitigate corruption and produce good governance, can 
widespread corruption take hold and flourish?  Trounstine’s Political Monopolies in American Cities 
(2008) offers  some clues.  Her study of machine Chicago and reformed San Jose questions the 
conventional machine (corrupt) vs. reform (not corrupt) dichotomy, essentially finding both to be 
alternative systems for “building political monopolies” (p. 217). Trounstine shows that political 
monopolies – defined as coordinated systems of bias that control resources necessary to maintain power 
– can emerge in both systems of government. Whether machine or reform, Trounstine writes, political 
“monopolies shape who is elected and appointed to office and when power is likely to be shared. 
They influence which residents are likely to participate in elections and whether or not participation 
affects political outcomes” (p. 5). For Trounstine, both machine and reform monopolies employ similar 
strategies and institutions that serve to maintain a regime’s hold on power. “When politicians cease to 
worry about reelection,” she writes, “they become free to pursue government policy that does not reflect 
constituent preferences. They acquire the ability to enrich themselves and their supporters” (p. 3). 
Trounstine’s study helps us understand how corruption could have emerged in Bell as it exposes the 
myth of the council manager system as an inherent bulwark against corruption. In the case of Bell, 
monopoly control over city government was enabled by a confluence of factors that began to take shape in 
the 1990s: declining voter participation, lack of media scrutiny, and community organization 
disengagement. Combined with a system originally designed to disenfranchise immigrants, these 
underlying factors allowed a predatory state to emerge. However, unlike Trounstine’s political 
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monopolies, which over time served relatively narrow private interests within a city, corruption in 
Bell flourished in a city that was lacking in active and organized constituencies, and faced little or no 
outside scrutiny.  As a result, a handful of corrupt Bell officials effectively became the city’s only 
constituency. 
 
          Voter Participation: The Rules of the Game 
 
Most studies of the impact of Progressive reforms on voter turnout support the contention that 
Progressive governments produce comparatively low turnout.  Wood’s (2002) analysis of municipal 
turnout found no significant differences between voter participation in reformed and non-reformed 
cities. Wood found that the initiative, referendum, and recall in particular tend to increase voter 
turnout by giving voters direct decision-making authority over city policies. However, Wood’s study 
did not independently examine high-immigration cities like Bell. Although more study is needed, the 
general scholarly consensus is that Progressive reforms reduce the slice of the electorate who regularly 
vote, disproportionally limiting voter participation among immigrants and minorities (Caren 2007, 
Hajnal and Lewis 2002, 2003, Alford and Lee 1968). 
In one of the few studies of voter turnout in California municipal elections, Hajnal, Lewis, and 
Louch (2002) emphasized the importance of election timing. The authors found that, on average, 
presidential elections produced 36 percent higher turnout than off-cycle, “local only” elections 
typically held in the spring. As with previous studies, turnout in local elections was linked in part to 
higher socioeconomic status and ethnicity. “Even after controlling for socio-economic status,” the 
authors wrote, “the Asian American and Latino share of the population are both tied to lower 
turnout among [voting age] adult residents” (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002, 45). However, they noted 
that, controlling for socio-economic factors and citizenship, Hispanics are not associated with lower than 
average turnout in California municipal elections. Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) found that lower 
turnout at the local level leads to political underrepresentation, particularly for Asian Americans and 
Latinos.  Finally, Caren’s (2007) study of electoral turnout in 38 large American cities linked higher 
turnout to election timing, political party activity, closeness of a race, and non-reformed political 
structures.4  
                                                            
4 Overall, Caren found that between 1978 and 2003 average turnout among registered voters was 27 percent. 
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Scholarship examining the impact of other factors such as city size is more mixed. Kelleher and 
Lowry (2004, 2008) found that political participation was substantially similar—even slightly higher—
in larger cities, raising questions about “presumed social, economic, and political advantages of smaller 
towns” (p. 721). In contrast, Oliver found that rates of voter participation tend to decline relative to an 
increase in a city’s population. However, for Oliver, more robust democracy in suburbs often comes at 
the expense of the greater social good: “suburbanizaton, by segregating the population is suppressing 
citizen involvement in community affairs, is depriving many localities and metropolitan areas other civic 
capacity and thus their ability to solve many contemporary social problems” (p. 7). 
Finally, the voter participation literature also examines individual-level factors that motivate 
electoral participation. Over the years research has focused on salient causes of low voter turnout 
including incumbency, competitive elections, age, race, socio-economic status, and education (Jacobson 
1983, Cox and Munger 1989). Scholars have also studied the consequences of low voter turnout, 
including distrust of government (Bobo and Gilliam 1990), lack of political efficacy (Finkel 1985), 
and the undermining of democratic legitimacy (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Guinier 1994). On 
the positive side, Bennett and Resnick (1990) found that higher turnout tends to create a self-reinforcing 
dynamic that serves to engage residents in local politics.   
As an important indicator of civic engagement, voter participation is a critical component in helping 
to hold elected officials accountable. Presumably, higher rates of voter participation can safeguard 
against corruption as active and engaged citizens watchdog the actions of local officials. In the case of 
Bell, although the city’s small size might in theory lend itself to political participation, the combination 
of Bell’s Progressive reformed structures, lack of media scrutiny, and rapid demographic change during 
the 1980s and 1990s together appear to have created a dynamic of civic disengagement in the city. 
 
Southeast Los Angeles County:  Corridor of Corruption 
 
Allegations of municipal corruption go back decades long the industrial corridor south of downtown 
Los Angeles between the 110 Freeway and 710 Long Beach Freeway. Quinones (2007) examined the 
political implications of economic, demographic, and political shifts in the city of South Gate during the 
1990s and 2000s. Quinones’s tells the story of Albert Robles who, using “Mexican-style Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) tactics,” emerged as something of a Boss-like figure in the city in 2001. 
 8 
 
Charged with threatening rival politicians in 2002, the South Gate City Council created for Robles the 
job of deputy city manager, leaving the city on the hook for his more than $100,000 per year salary and 
substantial legal fees. Additional practices such as firing city department heads and – after doing away 
with civil service exams and replacing them with highly paid loyalists – left the city on the edge of 
bankruptcy. Serving as city treasurer, Robles was recalled by voters and convicted in 2005 of 30 federal 
counts of bribery, money laundering, and public corruption (Quinones 2007). 
Quinones cited a number of factors to explain corruption in South Gate. For Quinones, “economic 
and demographic change, like a hurricane, had razed the traditions and institutions that maintain 
community life. These had not had time to grow back” (Quinones, 91). Quinones also cited expectations 
among recent immigrants that they would return to their home country and Mexican cultural biases that 
“all politics are corrupt” as reason for low rates of community participation. In addition, because of the 
lack of media coverage, negative political mailers and attack phone calls made up most of the 
information available to many voters. However, for Quinones, the scandal served to spark greater 
community awareness and engagement in city politics (Quinones 2007). 
 
<<<Insert Figure 1: Map of LA County ‘Gateway Cities’>>> 
 
Victor Valle’s (2009) history of the City of Industry tells the story of a municipality conceived in 
corruption. Seeking to circumvent a state law requiring incorporating communities to have 500 resident 
voters, Valle describes how city founders conspired to count 169 patients and 31 employees of a local 
mental hospital as resident voters, allowing the city’s 1957 incorporation to proceed. Armed with the 
requisite planning, financial, and police power, Valle labels Industry a “microstate” where capital 
interests “completely swallow the functions of citizenship” (74). During the 1980s Industry, which 
straddles the 60 Freeway east of downtown Los Angeles, witnessed a number of high-profile convictions 
for municipal corruption. 
More recently, allegations of corruption have again emerged in the industrial city of Vernon. 
Incorporated in 1905, Vernon has operated as a quasi-fiefdom run by a handful of family members and 
cronies. In 2010, the Los Angeles Times reported that the city had been paying unusually high annual 
salaries—in some cases more than $1 million—to city employees and outside consultants. The city was 
also found to have paid its part-time city council members—three of whom have been in office since 
1981—an annual salary of nearly $70,000, far above state averages. Prior to 2006, the city had not had a 
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contested election in 25 years. 
In recent years, numerous Vernon officials have been fined or charged with corruption. Former 
Mayor Leonis Malburg, grandson of Vernon’s founder who served on the city council for five decades, 
was ordered to pay more than $500,000 in fines to the city after being convicted of voter fraud and 
conspiracy.5  In 2011 former Vernon City Administrator Bruce Malkenhorst plead guilty to 
misappropriation of public funds. Subsequently, the pension giant CalPERS slashed his $500,000 per year 
state pension by one-fifth, an action Malkenhorst is currently fighting in court. 
Corruption in Vernon has flourished amid some rather unique circumstances. As of 2008, the 5.2 
square mile city had 1,800 businesses employing a daytime population of more than 60,000, but only 91 
permanent residents, and 70 registered voters (Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters). In a 2000 
special election, voters passed a measure extending council-members terms from four to five years. 
Critics note that this prevents the possibility of an opposition slate by ensuring that no more than one 
official would come up for re-election each year. All of Vernon’s residents, many of whom are city 
employees, live in 23 city-owned and administered housing units, most of which are heavily subsidized 
by the city. For Valle (2009), the city’s “indentured” voters are expected to vote for the city’s preferred 
candidates and ballot measures in municipal elections. Critics point out that because of Vernon’s 
housing monopoly, Vernon is a city where officials effectively select the voters, casting further doubt on 
Vernon’s legitimacy as a democratic entity (Becerra, Allen, and Christensen 2010, Valle 2009). 
In early 2011, California State Assembly Speaker John Perez joined a chorus of Vernon critics to 
sponsor a bill to forcibly disincorporate the city. In response, Vernon went on a lobbying offensive 
and media blitz to highlight the prospect of thousands of jobs fleeing the region if Vernon was 
shut down. It also hired former State Attorney General John Van De Kamp and longtime good-
government reformer Robert Stern to examine the city’s questionable practices and recommend ethics 
reforms, most of which have not yet been implemented. With help from the League of California Cities 
and the powerful business group Vernon Property Association, the city successfully beat back the 
proposal.   
 
City of Bell: A Demographic and Political History 
 
The 2.6 square mile city of Bell is a swan-shaped municipality located several miles southeast of 
                                                            
5 A Los Angeles Superior Court judge cited Malburg’s age and medical history as a reason not to incarcerate him. 
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downtown Los Angeles. As seen in Figure 2, the 710 freeway and the Los Angeles River form the 
city’s eastern boundary with the exception of an industrial area in the northeastern portion of the city 
that is bisected by the freeway. Most of the city’s residential neighborhoods lie between Randolph Street 
to the north and Florence Avenue to the south. Gage Avenue and Florence Avenue, both major east-west 
commercial thoroughfares, are lined by small mom-and-pop ethnic stores and markets, while national 
retail chain stores such as Starbucks and CVS anchor north-south Atlantic Avenue. 
The city’s 2010 population was 35,477, 91 percent of whom identified as Hispanic. Seventy-five 
percent of Hispanics in Bell reported Mexican descent. According to the 2013 American Community 
Survey, 48 percent of Bell residents identified themselves as foreign-born, 34 percent were noncitizens, 
and 89 percent spoke a language other than English at home. As seen in Figure 3, the White population in 
Bell declined dramatically from 76 percent in 1970, to 13 percent in 1980. By the 2010 Census, Whites 
made up roughly six percent of residents, with a sizeable number of Whites (37 percent) reporting Arab 
descent.6 Those identifying with “two or more races” on the 2010 Census make up the next largest 
group, followed by small numbers of blacks, American Indians, and Asians/ Pacific Islanders. 
 
<<<Insert Figure 2: Map of the City of Bell and Surrounding Cities>>> 
 
In 2010, only 29 percent of the city’s housing was classified as owner-occupied. Only four 
percent of Bell residents had a bachelor’s degree or higher, and only 30 percent had a high school 
degree. Of adults 25 years and over, 35 percent reported less than a ninth-grade education. Most Bell 
residents were employed either in manufacturing, transportation, sales and office, or service-related 
professions. The 2013 per capita income in Bell was estimated to be $12,076, making it one of the 
poorest communities in southern California (Census 2010, American Community Survey 2013). 
During most of the 19th century, the area that would become the City of Bell was part of a former 
Spanish land-grant known as Rancho San Antonio. Following Anglo conquest, the area remained an 
important part of a large ranching and agricultural industry in southern California. By the 1920s, 
population growth brought a new economy: real estate speculation. Like much of southern California, 
Southeast Los Angeles became a preferred destination for white immigrants from the South and 
Midwest hoping to join the region’s expanding industrial economy and suburban good life (Havener 





and Commerce incorporated cheaply as Lakewood Plan cities, helping to complete the existing political 
patchwork of southeast Los Angeles. 
 
<<<Insert Figure 3: Ethnic Change in Bell, 1970-2010>>>  
 
In his incisive analysis of Southeast Los Angeles County, William Fulton (1997) traced the region’s 
economic and political transformation from blue-collar Anglo to blue-collar Latino. Fulton describes 
the bifurcation of the region’s 1950s economy into industrial cities such as Vernon, Industry, and 
Commerce to the north, and working-and-middle-class residential communities of Huntington Park, 
South Gate, Bell, Bell Gardens, Maywood, and Cudahy, to the south. By virtue of its strategic location 
between important rail yards and the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, the region emerged as an 
important hub of industrial production in the pre-and-post-World War II period. General Motors, 
Bethlehem Steel, Firestone, Sampson Tire and Rubber, and a number of other large manufacturing 
companies formed the backbone of the region’s employment. As early as 1935 Los Angeles was the 
largest industrial area west of Chicago, in part due to the region’s well-known hostility to unionization.7  
By 1940, there were 900 factories within a two-mile radius of South Gate (Nicolaides 2002). 
During the 1970s, the strong industrial base that had supported the region’s economy began to 
rapidly de-industrialize, earning the region the moniker “Los Angeles’s Rust Belt.”8  In its place 
emerged a post-industrial economy that Fulton describes as primarily “extractive.” In the new predatory 
economic order, wealth became concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of apartment 
owners, gambling operators, and recycling companies “designed to suck from a community whatever 
economic vitality might remain” (Fulton, 77). 
As a result of deindustrialization, many longtime white Bell residents fled to retirement 
communities in Arizona and other parts of California (Fuetsch and Griego 1991). Simultaneously, the 
area attracted an influx of upwardly mobile Chicanos and new Latin American and Middle Eastern 
immigrants to fill jobs in the expanding service and transportation sectors. By 1990, the populations of 
Maywood, Huntington Park, Commerce, Cudahy, Bell Gardens, Bell, Pico Rivera, and South Gate were 
each at least 83 percent Latino. In the 1990 Census, 79 percent of Bell residents reported having 
moved to the city since 1980—only 7 percent reported having lived in the city since 1960 (1990 U.S. 
                                                            
7 Nicolaides describes the not-so-coincidental opening of General Motors’ South Gate plant in 1936, the year autoworkers in 
Flint Michigan organized the “great sitdown strike.” 
8 The best illustration of the region’s economic restructuring is “The Citadel,” a former tire plant located in the city of 




Politically, Fulton described southeast Los Angeles as a laboratory for studying “how smoothly 
suburban political power can be transferred from one race to another” (Fulton 1997, 70). The pattern 
that emerged in most cities during the 1980s and 1990s saw city governments remaining in the hands of 
Whites by virtue of their regular participation in municipal elections. By the mid-1990s, the political 
mobilization of relatively modest numbers of Latinos began to overturn the region’s Anglo regimes in 
favor of a new generation of primarily Hispanic leadership. In a number of instances, the transition was 
anything but smooth. Fulton chronicled ethnic political succession in the City of Bell Gardens, where 
Latino activism led to the 1991 recall of four longtime white council members, only to see the national 
media descend on the town to cover high-profile scandals and infighting that ensued (Fulton 1997). 
Nicolaides (2002) examined the cultural history of the “Hub Cities” region between 1920 and 1965, 
focusing on the blue-collar community of South Gate. Nicolaides described the emergence of South 
Gate as a quintessential “working class suburbia” where residents sought to create enclaves of economic 
security from the vagaries of industrial life. During the golden years of the 1950s and ’60s, the region’s 
industrial expansion bolstered family incomes and housing values such that aggregate wealth in cities 
such as Huntington Park, South Gate, Lynnwood, and Bell rivaled, and in some cases exceeded, more 
high status cities such as Santa Monica, Pasadena, Redondo Beach, and Torrance. 
The Midwestern and Southern immigrants who settled Los Angeles’s working class suburbias 
brought conservative political and social traditions, particularly with respect to religion and race. 
During the 1940s and ’50s, the encroachment by black communities to the city’s west became an ever 
present threat. Nicolaides describes political support for the use of racial covenants to help create a 
nearly all-white South Gate in the 1930s, with Alameda Street, a north-south thoroughfare then known as 
the “cotton corridor,” serving as the unofficial social barrier separating overwhelmingly White cities 
from growing Black populations in Watts and South Central (Davis 1990). Nicolaides describes how 
conflicts over housing and school integration9 were perceived by Whites as battles for “working-class 
survival.” By the late 1960s, the combination of civil rights, the 1965 Watts riot, and de-industrialization 
triggered massive white flight from the region (Nicolaides 2002). 
The City of Bell closely followed this general economic and social pattern. Compared to some of its 
more industrial neighbors, Bell boasted relatively large retail and small business sectors as well as 
                                                            
9 Nicolaides describes that, in the early 1960s, South Gate high school was 97 percent White, while Jordan high school, a few 
miles away, was 99 percent Black. Currently, South Gate High School is more than 95 percent Latino. 
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quintessential single-family neighborhoods (Nicolaides 2002). The city’s 1960s annexation of 313 acres 
that included the former Cheli Air Force Base allowed it to expand manufacturing and warehousing in the 
northeastern section of the city (Romo 1987). Currently, Bell’s northeastern portion includes a railroad 
yard, a large homeless shelter, a number of large warehouses and manufacturing operations, and a 
number of parcels owned by the Los Angeles Unified School District (Interview, Carlos Chacon). De-
industrialization and the 1993 closure of California Bell Club, a large poker parlor that had contributed 
roughly $2 million in annual revenue, dealt a severe blow to the city’s fortunes. In addition, the local 
newspaper, the Industrial Post, which had covered local politics since 1924 also folded. And by the 
mid-1990s, membership in longstanding community organizations such as Chamber of Commerce, 
Qantas Club, Rotary Club, and the Masonic and Moose lodges had significantly declined or was 
nonexistent (Goffard 2010). 
Amid the sweeping economic and demographic changes, Robert Rizzo was hired in 1993 as Bell’s 
city manager, reportedly for the modest annual sum of $78,000. During the 1990s, Rizzo earned a 
reputation both for competence and thrift, initiating layoffs and contracting services to private firms in 
order to save money (Goffard 2010). In the 1994 general municipal election, two Hispanics, City Clerk 
George Mirabal10 and Alfonso Rios were elected to the city council. But by 1997, Mirabal was again the 
only Latino on the city council. In March 2003 a critical power shift took place as two members who 
had served on the city council since the 1980s, George Bass and Rolf Janssen, retired. In an uncontested 
election, Victor Bello, Oscar Hernandez, and George Mirabal were appointed by Rizzo, forming the first 
Hispanic majority on the city council in Bell’s history. 
In 2005, an important but little-noticed structural reform was made to Bell city government. Amid 
almost no public discussion, the city council called a special election for November 29, 2005 to 
transform Bell, which had operated as a general law city since 1927, into a home rule city.11 Measure A,12 
as it was called, passed with 84 percent approval but only 336 yes votes, and a turnout rate of 4 percent 
of registered voters and .02 percent of voting age adults (see Figure 5). In addition, the election resulted 
in an unusually high number of absentee ballots (61 percent), leading to speculation that city officials 
                                                            
10 Mirabal was appointed by the Bell City Council as city clerk in 1992 in an uncontested election. 
11 Cities in California fall into two types: general law and home rule charter cities. Although California cities have 
witnessed an erosion of their home rule authority in recent decades (see Hogen- Esch 2011; Saxton, Hoene, and Erie 2002), 
home rule offer cities greater autonomy with respect to elections, governmental structure, and employee salaries. 
12 The text of Measure A curiously read: “Shall the voters of the City of Bell approve a City Charter, which allows The 




had orchestrated the result from behind the scenes. It is thought that Bell officials sought to use its 
home rule status to circumvent recently passed state laws limiting compensation for councilmember 
service on city boards and commissions. Within a year, city officials’ salaries again began to dramatically 
climb. 
 
A Scandal Erupts 
 
In the summer of 2010, two Los Angeles Times reporters began examining allegations of corruption in 
the nearby City of Maywood. Their initial investigation then led the Times to track down reports of salary 
irregularities in Bell, including nearly $800,000 in annual salary for City Manager Robert Rizzo and 
unusually high salaries for Police Chief Randy Adams ($457,000), and Assistant City Manager Angela 
Spaccia ($376,000). The Times also revealed that Rizzo was the highest paid future retiree in California’s 
pension system, set to earn $600,000 annually for life. In addition, four of Bell’s five city council 
members were earning nearly $100,000 per year, mostly to sit on obscure city boards and commissions 
that seldom or never met. The compensation was far above the typical $8,000 annual salary for part-time 
city council members in California13 (Knoll 2010). 
Within days, Rizzo, Spaccia, and Adams resigned. Over the ensuing weeks and months, the 
embattled city council appointed an interim city manager, an interim city attorney, and a new assistant 
city manager. However, with its besieged city council, Bell became stuck in political limbo, unable to 
conduct regular business in the 5 months between October 2010 and April 2011 (Becerra, Gottlieb, and 
Winton, 2010).14 
Over the ensuing weeks, more allegations emerged. The Times reported that, in addition to his 
nearly $800,000 per year salary, City Manager Rizzo had negotiated a lucrative benefits agreement, 
making his total yearly compensation package greater than $1.5 million. Rizzo reportedly also arranged 
for nearly $900,000 in loans to various city employees over the last several years. And an agreement 
between Rizzo and new Bell Police Chief Randy Adams surfaced declaring Adams to be officially 
disabled, a designation that would allow him to avoid paying taxes on half of his anticipated $400,000 
                                                            
13 One Bell council member, Lorenzo Velez, who had been earning the normal salary of $8,000, was reportedly unaware of 
his colleagues’ higher levels of compensation. 
14 In an attempt to avoid total paralysis, the idea of having the scandal-tinged city council members appoint their own 
replacements was actually considered. 
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annual retirement pension (Pringle 2010).15 
By August 2010, allegations in Bell had ignited a media firestorm and the city emerged as a national 
poster child for government corruption. Four separate investigations unfolded. The U.S. Department of 
Justice began investigating civil rights allegations that Bell officials had orchestrated a scheme to 
boost city revenues by aggressively towing the cars of unlicensed immigrants, and charging triple the 
going rate to retrieve their automobiles. In recent years the city had been impounding between 2,000 
and 2,500 cars per year, a scheme that netted roughly $800,000 in annual revenues. The Justice 
Department also began investigating complaints of illegal code enforcement and parking violations in 
order to generate exorbitant fees for the city (Winton, Esquivel, and Vives 2010). 
California State Controller John Chiang produced three reports alleging that the city had illegally 
collected more than $5.6 million in local taxes. According to one of the Controller’s reports, Bell had 
illegally increased assessments16 on sewer fees and raised its business license taxes by more than 50 
percent during the previous decade. Bell’s property tax rate of 1.55 percent was found to be significantly 
higher than the countywide average of 1.16 percent. Chiang also discovered that monies were being 
collected specifically as a “retirement tax” to fund city employee pensions (State Controller 2010). 
And Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley opened a separate investigation into 
allegations of misappropriation of public funds, falsification of documents, and voter fraud by six 
former city council members and the city manager and assistant city manager. 
In late summer, a community group known as Bell Association to Stop the Abus, or BASTA, 
(Spanish for “Enough”) formed to raise funds and collect signatures to trigger a recall of the city council. 
At the March 8 Special Election, four members of the tainted council were formally recalled and replaced 
by new council members. Lorenzo Velez, the only member of the city council not charged with a crime 
or targeted for recall, lost his reelection bid. 
 
Voter Participation in Bell 
 
The recent corruption scandal in Bell raises a number of important issues with respect to political 
participation, government structure, and democratic accountability. In an attempt to explain the 
                                                            
15 Adams had never claimed to be disabled when serving previously as police chief for the much larger City of Glendale, 
where he reportedly earned $225,000 per year. 
16 Under Proposition 13, property in California is taxed statewide at 1percent of assessed value. Any additional taxes or 
special assessments levied by local governments require two-thirds voter approval. 
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emergence of institutional corruption in Bell, this section compares voter participation rates in Bell, Los 
Angeles County, and the State of California from 1980-2014. 
Following Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch (2002), this section measures voter turnout using percent 
registered voters and percent voting age adults to analyze voter participation in national, state, and 
local elections in Bell since 1980. Voter turnout in Bell is then compared to voter turnout in Los Angeles 
County and statewide among both registered voters and voting age adults since 1980. The figures for 
percent registered voters were obtained from the Los Angeles County Registrar, the California Secretary 
of State, and the Bell City Clerk. Voting age population data from the previous census was used instead 
of the number of eligible voters (see Caren 2007) in order to highlight obstacles to participation for 
noncitizens in Bell.  
 
General and Primary Elections, 1980–2010 
 
Data from state and national general and primary elections in Bell between 1980-2010 – when the 
scandal hit – reveal voter participation rates that were significantly, though not dramatically, lower than 
voter participation figures from Los Angeles County and statewide. As seen in Figure 4, the overall 
average rate of participation in state primary and general elections among Bell registered voters between 
1980 and 2010 was 41 percent, compared to 52 percent in Los Angeles County and 55 percent 
statewide. Between 1980 and 1990, average participation in primary and general elections in Bell was 49 
percent, compared to 58 percent in Los Angeles County and 59 percent statewide. Between 1997 and 
2010, the major period of ethnic political succession in Bell, average voter turnout among registered 
voters was 37 percent—a 4 percent decline. Turnout among registered voters over the same period in Los 
Angeles County remained the same, 49 percent, while turnout of registered voters statewide declined 5 
percent to 54 percent. 
Comparison of voter turnout in the City of Bell from 1980–2010 among voting age adults reveals an 
overall 13 percent average turnout, compared to 31 percent in Los Angeles County and 37 percent 
statewide. Between 1980 and 1990, average turnout among voting age adults in Bell was 18 percent, 
compared to 36 percent in Los Angeles County and 43 percent statewide. From 1997–2010, again, the 
major period of ethnic political succession, average voter turnout in Bell dropped six percentage points to 
12 percent. In Los Angeles County, average turnout among voting age residents between 1997 and 2010 




<<<Insert Figure 4: Turnout Registered Voters (RV) and Voting Age (VA) Population Bell, 
LA County, and California, 1980-2014>>> 
 
On average, turnout among voting age Bell residents between 1980 and 2010 in state and national 
elections was roughly half that of Los Angeles County, and one-third participation rates statewide. 
Though significant, relatively lower voter participation in Bell between 1980 and 2010 can be 
substantially explained by the city’s large population of noncitizens, low income, highly transient 
population, among many other factors (Jacobson 1983, Cox and Munger 1989). And recent declines in 
participation rates in Bell, Los Angeles County, and statewide are all consistent with a general trend 
toward a decline in voter participation nationally. Though comparatively low, adjusting for demographic 
factors, participation rates in Bell since 1980 were not abnormally low, at least with respect to turnout in 
state and national elections. 
  
Turnout in Bell Municipal Elections, 1980–2010 
 
Data from Bell municipal elections from 1980–2010 suggest a different conclusion. Between 1980 
and 2010, average turnout among registered voters was 29 percent. Among voting age adults, the 
average was 9 percent. Between 1980 and 1990, no municipal election in Bell received less than 20 
percent turnout among registered voters, and all elections were contested. During that timeframe, the 
average turnout in city elections among registered voters was 40 percent, including a particularly 
spirited 1982 election that attracted 88 percent turnout. 
Between 1980 and 2010, average turnout in Bell elections among voting age adults was 9 percent. 
Between 1980 and 1990 no election received more than 28 percent turnout and average turnout was 12 
percent. The large gap between the average turnout among registered voters (40 percent) and voting 
age adults (12 percent) is almost certainly due to the demographic transformation that took place in Bell 
during the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990, it appears that a relatively small portion of relatively active 
residents (older and white) made up a disproportionately large share of the city electorate. 
 




Between 1997 and 2010, however, there was a marked decline in participation in Bell municipal 
elections. As seen in Figure 5, no municipal election between 1997 and 2010 received more than 24 
percent turnout among registered voters. Average turnout over that timeframe was 16 percent. Among 
voting age adults over the same time period, no municipal election in the city received more than 10 
percent participation, while average turnout was 4 percent. In particular, the November 29, 2005 
Special Election stands out with only 4 percent of registered voters and .02 percent of voting age adults 
casting ballots on a measure to create a home rule charter. Over that time, three of the city’s seven 
municipal elections were uncontested, resulting in appointments to vacant seats on the council. It is 
likely that the lack of competitive elections was both a cause as well as an effect of a climate of political 
apathy in the city. As Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch note, “uncontested elections are bad news for voter 
participation in city elections” (2000, 42). 
  
Linking Corruption and Civic Engagement in Bell  
 
How and why did egregious corruption emerge in a council-manager system, a structure of 
government specifically designed by reformers to prevent corruption? In a prior article (Hogen-Esch 
2011) I argued that, by the early 2000s, the combination of declining voter participation, inadequate 
media coverage, and interest group disengagement caused Bell to devolve into the municipal equivalent 
of a ‘failed state.’ The central elements of that argument remain valid. However, my previous analysis of the 
scandal seemed to place insufficient responsibility on the individuals involved in perpetrating the corruption, 
and on the system itself. In this paper I have highlighted the role of the council-manager system in hindering 
civic engagement and insulating officials from accountability.  
As a product of ethnic conflict between native-born WASPs and late 19th and early 20th century 
immigrants, the council-manager system retains in its political DNA biases against participation that 
negatively impact immigrant communities. In the early 20th century, Progressive reformers dismantled 
corrupt machine institutions and created nonpartisan, professionally administered city government. Still 
today, the vast majority of California city governments employ council-manager government. Although 
scholars have examined the effect of reform structures on political participation generally (Caren 
2007, Hajnal and Lewis 2002, 2003, Alford and Lee 1968), surprisingly little attention has been paid to 
issues of participation and corruption specifically in high immigration cities. In conceptualizing reform 
regimes as substantially similar to machine systems—as “political monopolies”—Trounstine (2008) 
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offers insight as to how and why a political system designed to prevent corruption could itself become 
so corrupt. In Bell, reform structures intended to distance policymakers from politics instead insulated 
officials from traditional forms of political accountability. At the very least, recent patterns of 
corruption in Bell and other southeast Los Angeles cities serve to undermine the council-manager 
government’s purported benefits in preventing corruption. As Trounstine (2008) implies, under the 
right circumstances, corruption can flourish in any political structure. 
Additional factors contributed to the corruption in Bell. Global economic restructuring helps explain 
the area’s rapid transformation from blue-collar White in the 1960s to post-industrial immigrant Latino 
by the 1980s, creating conditions that allowed “extractive” (Fulton 1997) industries and politicians to 
prey upon recent arrivals. Community complacency was also a contributor. According to former Bell 
City Councilman Rolf Janssen, during the late 1990s a rising economy, lower crime rates, and 
improvements in the city’s physical infrastructure led to a collective apathy about city politics: “Things 
were going well in the late ’90s and early 2000s. People just stopped asking questions” (Interview, 
April 8, 2011). And a veteran reporter with the Los Angeles Wave commented that the ethnic 
homogeneity of the city council also contributed to the complacency: “there was a certain level of trust 
in having an all-Latino City Council. Now people feel a sense of betrayal” (Interview, Arnold Adler, 
April 14, 2011).  Finally, Bell’s large numbers of undocumented residents and recent arrivals clearly 
played a role in the lack of engagement in city affairs. Lewis, Ramakrishnan, and Patel (2004) note that 
all “immigrants occupy a somewhat uncertain role in local civic affairs . . . they are often recent arrivals; 
a high proportion either cannot or do not vote; and they are often not well connected to associations and 
interest groups that are important in local affairs” (iii).  
Above all, cases of political corruption in Bell and other high immigration cities underscore the 
pressing need for political reform to invigorate local democracy in communities with large numbers of 
recent immigrants. Even in the highly charged aftermath of Bell’s political corruption scandal, only 34 
percent of registered voters turned out for the March, 2011 recall election. Only 18 percent of registered 
voters showed up for the March 2013 election. Moreover, the scandal has not significantly increased 
voter registration in the city. As of June 2010, a month before the scandal broke, registration in Bell 
stood at 9,929 voters. At the March 2011 recall election, registration had increased by 10 percent. At the 
November 2014 election, the number of registered voters had increased to 11,306.  Turnout in state and federal 
elections since the 2010 scandal has generally lagged slightly behind county and statewide turnout rates (see 
Figure 4). Although an improvement, these figures suggest that the corruption scandal will not be 
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sufficient to jumpstart community participation in the city, particularly as residents become further 
removed from the crisis with the passage of time. 
 
Reform Alternatives in Bell and Beyond 
 
Recent scandals in Bell and other cities highlight the need for political reforms that strengthen the 
fabric of local democracy to better incorporate longtime residents and newcomers into the political 
process. Since the election of a new city council in 2011, a number of reforms have been made. In 2005, 
City Administrator Rizzo instituted a five-year budget cycle which many observers believe was done to 
further discourage outside scrutiny on the city’s revenue and spending practices. In 2011 Bell returned 
to producing an annual budget. As an y  city’s most important policy document, regular discussion 
about budgetary matters is critical in promoting public participation. The new city council has also 
sought to add greater transparency by devoting more resources to providing relevant and user-friendly 
information concerning expenditures, revenues, meetings, and links to election results and other 
documents relating to elections on the city’s website. Certainly, increasing “sunlight” can go a long way 
toward deterring public corruption and restoring faith in city government. 
 
This section highlights reform alternatives available to cities confronting municipal corruption: 
1. Increase Voter Participation. In order to increase voter participation and democratic 
accountability, cities facing corruption should consider aligning its municipal elections with higher 
turnout state primary and general elections in March and June. Based on average turnout among Bell 
voters in state elections from1995–2010, an increase of about 10 percent turnout among registered 
voters (from 16 percent to 25 percent) can be expected. Although the anticipated benefit appears 
relatively small, a 9-point increase would amount to a 56 percent upswing—probably the single most 
effective way to increase local voter turnout (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). 
The downsides of adding municipal elections to the state ballot include the potential for voter 
confusion, fatigue, and higher rates of incumbency (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch, 2002). However, what 
cities may lose in voter fatigue, confusion, and incumbency could be made up in greater political 
participation and civic legitimacy. In addition, because of space limitations, cities in California are not 
always guaranteed a place on primary and general election ballots. Finally, to the extent that the scandal 
in Bell increases interest by prospective candidates in running for city office, interest and participation in 
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local affairs is likely to increase.  
2. State and Professional Oversight.  The auditing authority of California State Controller should 
be expanded to include greater oversight over municipal finances. State laws limiting compensation for 
service on city boards and commissions in California’s charter cities should also be instituted. In 
addition, improved oversight from professional organizations such as ICMA and Municipal Finance 
Associates should be exercised to ensure that established accounting practices and standards are 
followed by city administrators and staff. Members of the Bell city council are now expected to sign a 
‘personal code of conduct’ statement, an attempt to change the culture of city government. 
3. Media Coverage.  Improving media coverage of local politics is a critical element in rebuilding 
democracy in Bell and similar cities. Because of recent media consolidation and cutbacks in local 
reporting among established media outlets, voters simply do not have access to the same breadth and 
depth of political coverage of local politics as in past decades. Improved communication over the 
Internet by city government, citizen journalists and bloggers, and traditional and ethnic media may hold 
promise for improved coverage of local affairs. Above all, the Bell case underscores the critical 
importance of local media presence, both in uncovering political corruption after the fact as well as in 
deterring future corruption. 
4. Community Engagement.  If corruption is to be prevented, all residents, including recent 
immigrants, need to participate in politics. New organizations that are indigenous to and appropriate for 
each community must be created and integrated into the local political system. Local ‘Hometown 
Associations,’ typically created for the purposes of assisting family members and friends in the home 
country, are one example. Broadening the function of Hometown Associations, common throughout 
Southern California, to foster participation in California local governments could help fill the 
institutional gap that currently exists between policymakers and local residents. 
5. Disincorporation. Residents of chronically corrupt municipalities may also consider 
disincorporation of their municipality in favor of county governance. Although this reform might seem 
drastic, it holds promise for preventing corruption by creating Madisonian-style competition among 
various factions in a larger political entity. Unlike the scandal-plagued the City of Vernon, where state 
lawmakers briefly considered a unilateral disincorporation, state statutes permit community residents to 
petition for a citywide vote on disincorporation. Following a series of corruption scandals, residents of 





The Need for Municipal State-Building in California 
 
Despite recent media hoopla surround the corruption scandal, Bell remains a fairly unremarkable 
city. Its streets are relatively safe, and many of its quiet, tree-lined neighborhoods and commercial 
thoroughfares look much like suburbs elsewhere in Southern California. This paper has examined the 
link between corruption in Bell and another seemingly unremarkable part of the story: the council-
manager system of government. How did corruption emerge in a system intentionally designed to 
produce good government and prevent corruption? Trounstine (2008) reminds us that council-manager 
government is less about preventing corruption than it is simply an alternate power arrangement – its 
own form of “political monopoly.”  As a system whose raison’detre was to limit political power and 
participation of early 20th century immigrants, the system seems particularly ill-suited to the governance 
of 21st century municipalities with large numbers of recent immigrants. 
 In the late 19th and early 20th century, active political parties and competition among ethnic 
groups drew new immigrants into American local politics. In contrast, most new immigrants to 
California’s Progressive reformed cities land in a political dead-zone nearly devoid of political parties, 
media, or community organizations designed to help assimilate newcomers into the local body politic. 
And due to ethnic clustering, economic segregation, and political geography—Latinos make up more 
than 90 percent of the population in many of the small cities of southeast Los Angeles—there is little of 
the kind of conflict and cooperation among ethnic groups characteristic of American urban politics at 
the turn of the 20th century. 
And yet in the effort to build local civic capacity, a small city’s size may also be one of its primary 
strengths. One of the long-standing ironies of California local democracy is that although relatively few 
groups participate in local affairs, those that do receive a disproportionate share of the benefits. 
Compared to larger cities, small towns do offer a scale and familiarity that lend easily to democratic 
participation (Oliver 2000). In Southeast Los Angeles and elsewhere, small-scale politics may yet offer 
avenues for building local political institutions that both deter corruption and focus on the core service 
needs of residents. Among the many questions the case of Bell raises is whether local democracy can be 
considered legitimate when half or more of the voting age population in a city are not able to register 
their policy preferences at the ballot box. Although this article does not address federal immigration 
reform initiatives, it is clear that the presence of large numbers of residents in American cities unable to 
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select their local representatives is a factor that undermines public trust in local democracy. 
Political scientists Ron Hayduk (2006) has argued that noncitizens should be once again allowed to 
vote in American elections, noting that citizenship was not tied to voting in most American states until 
Progressive reforms made citizenship a prerequisite for voting. He argues that voting systems in the 
United States has always been politicized in ways that benefit powerful groups at the expense of the less 
powerful, citing the historical exclusion of non-propertied White men, African-Americans and women. 
And recent efforts by numerous state governments to pass voter ID laws following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Shelby (2012) decision – which invalidated portions of the 1965 Voting Right Act17 – 
underscore the larger point that political institutions can be crafted in ways to make voting more or less 
difficult. Although a full consideration of these arguments is not possible here, it is nonetheless 
important to note the long history of systemic attempts to limit voter enfranchisement in the U.S. 
Hayduk notes that noncitizens have recently been allowed to vote in six cities in Maryland, in school 
district elections in Chicago, and in so-called “parent trigger” elections to create charter schools in 
California. Other jurisdictions, such as New York City, Washington DC, and Burlington, Vermont are 
all seriously considering allowing noncitizens to voting local elections (Hayduk 2014).  Perhaps it is 
time to consider a similar approach in California. Certainly, if one were to design a system of local 
government to intentionally produce consistently low civic engagement – particularly in high immigration 
cities like Bell – one could hardly do better than the council-manager form of government. 
Fortunately, awareness of the problems of civic engagement is on the rise. Following one of the 
lowest turnouts for a mayoral election (23% of registered voters in May 2013) in the city’s history, the 
City of Los Angeles convened a special commission to examine ways to increase turnout.  The 
committee’s recommendations resulted in the City Council placing Charter Amendments 1 and 2 on the 
March 5, 2015 municipal ballot. Starting in 2020, the amendments would consolidate LA City and Los 
Angeles Unified School District elections with state and federal elections in the hope of increasing 
interest and turnout.  And although there are clear potential downsides in terms of further crowding an 
already long ballot and increased campaign costs, supporters argue the potential benefits make this 
change a worthwhile experiment in election reform.18 And in recent years, numerous California cities – 








elections under pressure from civil rights and immigrant advocacy groups. What has been often lost in 
the conversation over these issues, however, is the larger historical picture about biases inherent to the 
council-manager system that disproportionately impact immigrant communities. 
The case of the Bell scandal represents far more than another spectacle of government corruption in 
southeast Los Angeles. Above all, abuses in Bell and other California cities should be viewed as a larger 
failure of local political systems to incorporate new immigrants. As the political consequences of recent 
immigration continue to unfold in the coming decades, it is likely that the conditions that led to 
predatory politics in Bell either currently exist or will emerge in cities across California and the United 
States. Failure to recognize and reform the underlying conditions that perpetuate corruption risks a 
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11/14 GG  21%  10%  31% 20% 42% 27%
6/14 GP  17%  8%  17% 11% 25% 16%
11/12 PG  62%  28%  68% 44% 77% 16%
6/12 PP  47%  21%  22% 13% 31% 19%
11/10 GG  47%  20%  54% 35% 60% 42%
6/10 GP  16%  6%  23% 15% 33% 23%
11/08 PG  75%  29%  82% 49% 79% 56%
6/08 GP  9%  3%  20% 12% 28% 18%
2/08 PP  16%  8%  55% 32% 58% 37%
11/06 GG  41%  14%  52% 30% 56% 36%
6/06 GP  19%  6%  27% 15% 34% 21%
11/04 PG  61%  20%  79% 45% 76% 51%
3/04 PP  23%  7%  38% 20% 44% 31%
11/02 GG  38%  13%  45% 26% 51% 31%
3/02 GP  17%  6%  26% 16% 35% 21%
11/00 PG  56%  19%  68% 40% 71% 45%
3/00 PP  40%  8%  48% 27% 54% 32%
11/98 GG  42%  13%  53% 32% 58% 39%
6/98 GP  34%  11%  38% 23% 42% 28%
11/96 PG  56%  16%  65% 39% 66% 47%
3/96 PP  25%  6%  37% 21% 42% 28%
11/94 GG  47%  11%  59% 43% 61% 40%
6/94 GP  24%  5%  32% 18% 35% 23%
11/92 PG  55%  13%  76% 44% 75% 52%
6/92 PP  33%  7%  48% 20% 47% 29%
11/90 GG  38%  8%  55% 35% 59% 36%
6/90 GP  27%  6%  38% 24% 41% 24%
11/88 PG  58%  21%  73% 50% 73% 59%
6/88 PP  40%  12%  46% 29% 48% 35%
11/86 GG  49%  17%  60% 39% 59% 44%
6/86 GP  31%  10%  39% 24% 40% 29%
11/84 PG  62%  24%  74% 50% 75% 57%
6/84 PP  46%  15%  49% 29% 49% 32%
11/82 GG  62%  21%  70% 42% 70% 47%
6/82 GP  49%  16%  53% 30% 53% 34%
11/80 PG  69%  25%  77% 46% 77% 51%






14%  50%  30%  54%  35% 
     
       Source: Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters; California Secretary of State;  
     1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 U.S. Census 
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  PP=Presidential Primary; GP=Gubernatorial Primary; PG=Presidential General; 
  GG=Gubernatorial General 
 
  
       Figure 5:  
    Turnout Municipal Elections  
         City of Bell, 1980‐2013 
Election  
Date 
Reg.
Voters 
Voting‐age 
Adults 
March 5, 2013 18% 8%
March 8, 2011** 34% 12%
 March 3, 2009 24% 6%
 March 6, 2007 6% 2%
 November 29, 2005 4% .02%
 March 8, 2005* ‐‐ ‐‐
November 4, 2003 10% 4%
March 4, 2003* ‐‐ ‐‐
 March 6, 2001* ‐‐ ‐‐
August 26, 1997 13% 4%
 March 4, 1997 36% 10%
April 12, 1994  51% 11%
 April 14, 1992* ‐‐ ‐‐
April 10, 1990  20% 4%
April 12, 1988  39% 12%
April 8, 1986  26% 9%
April 10, 1984  34% 11%
April 13, 1982  88% 28%
April 8, 1980  30% 10%
Ave. Turnout  29% 9%
  Source: City Clerk, City of Bell; LA County Registrar 
  *Uncontested Election; **Recall Election 
 
